The role of payments systems in influencing oral health care provision by Woods, Noel
Title The role of payments systems in influencing oral health care provision
Author(s) Woods, Noel
Publication date 2013-08-01
Original citation Woods N. The role of payments systems in influencing oral health care
provision. OA Dentistry. 2013 Aug 01;1(2)
Type of publication Article (peer-reviewed)
Link to publisher's
version
http://www.oapublishinglondon.com/oa-dentistry
http://www.oapublishinglondon.com/article/613
Access to the full text of the published version may require a
subscription.
Rights © 2013, Noel Woods. Licensee OA Publishing London 2013.
Creative Commons Attribution License (CC-BY). The final
HTML/PDF is also available at
http://www.oapublishinglondon.com/
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/uk/
Item downloaded
from
http://hdl.handle.net/10468/1529
Downloaded on 2017-02-12T06:31:32Z
Page 1 of 4
Critical review
Licensee OA Publishing London 2013. Creative Commons Attribution License (CC-BY)
For citation purposes: Woods N. The role of payments systems in influencing oral health care provision. OA Dentistry 
2013 Aug 01;1(1):2. Compe
ti
ng
 in
te
re
st
s:
 n
on
e 
de
cl
ar
ed
. C
on
fli
ct
 o
f i
nt
er
es
ts
: n
on
e 
de
cl
ar
ed
. 
A
ll 
au
th
or
s 
co
nt
ri
bu
te
d 
to
 c
on
ce
pti
on
 a
nd
 d
es
ig
n,
 m
an
us
cr
ip
t 
pr
ep
ar
ati
on
, r
ea
d 
an
d 
ap
pr
ov
ed
 t
he
 fi
na
l m
an
us
cr
ip
t.
A
ll 
au
th
or
s 
ab
id
e 
by
 t
he
 A
ss
oc
ia
ti
on
 fo
r 
M
ed
ic
al
 E
th
ic
s 
(A
M
E)
 e
th
ic
al
 r
ul
es
 o
f d
is
cl
os
ur
e.
Ep
id
em
io
lo
gy
 &
 O
ra
l H
ea
lth
The role of payments systems in influencing oral health 
care provisionN Woods*
Abstract
IntroductionThe unique characteristics of dental disease, such as its predictability, non-communicability, ease of diagno-sis, and its extensive prevention pos-sibilities, should result in greater cost control and an expectation of a better operation of the market mechanism than in general health care. These dif-ferentiating features, however, also increase the likelihood that services are over-consumed and/or over-pro-
vided. The most influential feature 
determining efficient resource use in health care provision is the type of payment system. A per capita system serves as a link between the dentist’s future income and service provision, and provides equity in terms of cov-erage and access. The result is that 
patients may benefit from fewer un-necessary treatments, and encoun-ter more preventive activities. The system is limited by the potential for under-treatment and problems with patient selection.
With fixed salary, the dentist’s in-come is independent of service pro-vision, with incentives for low pro-duction, which leads to high costs per patient. Salaried dentists generally provide more prevention services, and allow the targeting of services to priority or ‘special needs’ groups. The 
patient benefits from the greater eq-uity of a service and the location of services can be determined by com-munity needs. Fee-per-item is the 
most common payment system in dental service provision for adults, where the dentist is rewarded ac-cording to the amount of work un-dertaken. Fee-per-item removes the incentive for supervised neglect or to cherry pick patients. It also solves the problems of patient selection and under-treatment, associated with 
capitation financing. Fee-per-item can encourage the use of services by patients on the advice of the den-tist with the result that costs can be 
inflated with little impact on oral health itself. In the absence of a sys-tem of probity, dentists can manipu-late demand and set fees, and pro-vided moral hazard can occur in the form of supplier inducement. This review discusses the role of payment 
systems in influencing oral health care provision
ConclusionThe optimal dental contract may be a ‘blended’ payment system whereby dentists receive a proportion of their income through capitation, a propor-tion from allowances and proportion from fee-per-item of service.
IntroductionDental care has unique features that distinguish it from health care in gen-eral1. Diseases are relatively few and tend to be more predictable. Dental care is rarely in response to a life threatening occurrence and untreat-ed disease rarely has dramatic con-sequences on an individual’s health. Dental diseases are relatively easy to diagnose giving the patient more time to plan and take treatment deci-sions. Disease is non-communicable and there is much greater scope for prevention. As a result of these dis-tinctive features, one would  expect 
market mechanism to perform bet-ter in dental care than in other health services as dental disease across individual’s can be treated as independent2. A feature of market economies is that, in the presence of externalities such as communica-ble disease, markets fail to allocate 
goods and services efficiently. The non-emergency nature of most den-tal care, the ease of access to relevant information for treatment decisions via X-rays, the different treatment alternatives with varying costs, make it possible to control costs and for a 
more efficient market mechanism3. However, the distinguishing charac-teristics of dental care also increase the likelihood that services are over-consumed and/or over-provided.Among the leading strategies to re-form health care is the development and implementation of new payment models. The goal is to change the way physicians, dentists, hospitals, and other care providers are paid in order to emphasise higher quality at lower costs—in other words, to im-prove value. 
Payment systemsWhen evaluating payment models, the framework used was how well the various payment systems support the attributes of value-driven health sys-tem where health is maximised and 
care is: patient centred, efficient, safe and effective, timely and assessable, accountable, innovative and coordi-nated across providers and facilities. The choice of payment system is the 
key issue for efficient resource use in health care provision4. The term ‘payment system’ denotes the body of price regulation existing in the mar-ket for dental services5. A dentist or 
* Corresponding author Email: n.woods@ucc.ieCentre for Policy Studies, University College, Cork, Ireland
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diseased teeth and similar disease levels to their counterparts treated under fee-for-service14. Administra-tion costs in a per capita system are often high and where the population is scattered widely, the population base may be too small to ensure that 
dentists receive a sufficient per capi-ta income7.A weakness of a per capita scheme 
identified in different studies7,13–15 is that the quality of the treatment provided can be reduced. Since den-
tists get a fixed fee per patient under 
supervision, their financial rewards are positively correlated with the number of patients. The economic in-centive is to minimise the time spent per patient in order to maximise the panel of patients. That may result in untreated dental disease. A further weakness is that the dentists have less time for prevention, for giving advice, or for carrying out preventive 
procedures such as fissure sealing16. The most recent evaluation of a per 
capita payment scheme has been un-dertaken in Norway in 201216. The au-thors found that a per capita scheme did not result in a fall in the quality of dental care. However, the number of observations in this study was small 
and the project was publicly financed.
Fee-per-item remuneration
Fee-per-item financing rewards the dentist according to the amount of work undertaken. Dentists are paid a ‘piece-rate’ for each individual treat-
ment carried out, with specified fees unbundled for each type of treatment 
(fillings, extractions, crowns, bridges, dentures, etc.). With fee-per-item the emphasis is on productivity and it encourages the delivery of care and maximising patient visits. As a pay-ment mechanism, it supports ac-
countability, and it is relatively flexi-ble in that it can be used regardless of the size or organizational  structure of a dentist’s practice, or the geographi-cal location of care. With fee-per-item 
financing, it is easier to ensure qual-ity, and it also solves the  problems 
system fewer dentists are required; education and training costs are re-duced, thus reducing public expendi-ture7. Patient access and coverage should more equitable. Society should 
benefit from a greater mix of patients being seen and the dentist may have more time to interact with patients and to device dental plans to suit their needs. A per capita system separates the link between the amount of ser-
vice provided and financial reward. Relative to fee-for-service, capitation may encourage more preventive ac-tivities as the dentist’s future income is not dependant of service provision7.The main drawback of per capita remuneration involves the possibility for patient selection and under-treat-ment7,8. Clearly, the dentist should not have a role in patient selection. To avoid patient selection problems, 
a well-defined and balanced patient population should be allocated ran-domly to the dental practice. How-ever, with per capita systems patients are generally allocated geographical-ly. This method of patient allocation may induce bias as a patient pool with a concentration of rural pa-tients may have more dental disease as rural dwellers generally have less 
exposure to fluoridated water sup-plies. Problems of patient selection and under-treatment can be limited by risk adjustment of the per capita fee9. If patient groups with high-lev-els of treatment needs can be iden-
tified10–12, then these characteristics can be used in order to differentiate the per capita fee. The differentiation must not be based on characteristics that the dentist can manipulate. With 
a fixed pool of patients for an agreed remuneration dentists have an in-centive to under-treat to save costs. A 
per capita system can lead to what is termed supervised neglect13,14. How-ever, the evidence per capita system for the treatment of children in the General Dental Service in Britain found no evidence of systematic ne-glect among those treated, but they 
had fewer fillings, more untreated 
physician’s incentives depend on the combination of payment basis, pay-ment schedule and, to lesser degree, the payment procedure4. A ‘payment 
basis’ is defined as the level of the payment in a certain period of time, which is remuneration for costs in-
curred. This is influenced by the hours worked by the dentist, use of equip-ments, prescription drugs, rent, heat-ing and electricity used in the practice. The ‘payment basis’ also includes the number and types of service provi-sions, the number of: treatment epi-sodes, treated patients and potential patients. The ‘payment schedule’ is a function that connects revenue with the components making up the pay-ment basis4. The ‘payment procedure’ is generally referred to as the institu-tional mechanism of reimbursement.Different types of payment systems 
can be used as a means of influencing both consumer and dentist behaviour. Consumer incentives derive from the interaction of individual preferences. Constraints limiting their prefer-ences, such as income and prices, are 
also influenced by the health status of the individual, as poor health can lead to a loss of income. Consumer incentives are revealed in terms the exertion of preventive effort, the de-cision to initiate an episode of care, and the selection of provider. Den-tists are generally remunerated in three different methods: per capita, 
fee-per-item and fixed salary, and 
these can be used as a means of influ-encing dentists’ behaviour to provide higher quality at lower costs. 
Per capita remunerationA per capita payment system is main-ly used in primary care and is suit-
able in terms of exchequer financing, because the price and quantity are agreed at the commencement of con-tract6. The system maximises efficien-cy with the incentive to drive down 
costs, thus maximising profits. At con-tract renewal, the  government agency can negotiate down the price on foot of these reduced costs. In a per capita 
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care thus avoiding issues such as over referral, causing increased wait-ing lists and more unmet need. Fixed salary remuneration allows the tar-geting of dental services to priority or ‘special needs’ groups21. There is more clinical time for each patient and this is particularly suited to the ‘special needs patient’ and the ‘den-tal phobic’ who can be given the time necessary for proper orientation and multiple appointments can be given if required13. With fixed salary remu-neration, the location of services can be determined by community needs and not on the individualistic need of a dentist acting in self-interest. 
DiscussionThe author has referenced some of his own studies in this review. These referenced studies have been con-ducted in accordance with the Dec-laration of Helsinki (1964), and the protocols of these studies have been approved by the relevant ethics com-mittees related to the institution in which they were performed. All hu-man subjects, in these referenced studies, gave informed consent to participate in these studies.The incentive-structure in sys-
tems of remuneration influences the behaviour of both patient and pro-vider22. Consumer incentives are neg-ligible in health care because of asym-metric information as the physician’s informational advantage can be used 
to influence the preferences of the individual23. However, a significant 
influence on consumer incentives re-sults from eligibility for public or pri-vate insurance. When an individual becomes eligible for dental services under an insurance plan they may alter their behaviour (moral hazard) and seek more dental care than they would have if they were not insured19. Consumer moral hazard arises be-cause insurance eligibility reduces the cost of treatment to zero at the point of consumption and this makes poor oral health less desirable and prevention less vigorously pursued. 
lack of uptake or non-attendance brings the overall cost down. There is no incentive for the funding agency to encourage the use of the services as more use means more associated 
costs to the state. Fee-per-item fi-nancing should be governed by an ef-
ficient system of probity that would detect and deter dentists from pro-viding services other than those that are based on need18.
Fixed salary remunerationIn many European countries, den-tal services are provided by salaried health board dentist to those under the age of 16. Health authorities gen-erally employ the dentist and control the cost, nature, and extent of the service by determining the terms of reference of employment. The health authority owns the premises and equipments, and has direct control over standards. The advantages of a salaried system are that health care planning is more informed, as den-tists’ salaries are known in advance and that promotion could be perfor-mance related.The dentist’s income is independ-ent of production. They maximise their utility subject to an income-leisure trade-off. Since income is in-dependent of the number of patients, there are no incentives for dentists to work harder. This results in low production, which leads to high costs per patient7. Salaried dentists gener-ally provide more prevention servic-
es giving a marginal private benefit 
from the effectiveness of fissure seal-
ants and fluoride applications13 and greater recall to monitor preventive programmes in place. Producer mor-al hazard is counteracted as either over-treatment or over-prescribing 
is not financially rewarded19. Ad-vanced innovative treatments can be 
undertaken with financial loss.  
The patient benefits from the great-er equity of a service for all on the basis of the need20. With a fixed sal-
ary, there are no financial incentives 
to refer difficult cases for  secondary 
of patient selection and under-treat-ment, which are associated with per 
capita financing7. If dentists are re-munerated fee-per-item of service, they no longer have an incentive to avoid patients who have high levels of treatment need. With fee-per-item services, equipments and premises are provided and maintained by the dental practitioner, thus minimising capital input and investment by the state. This provides a clear incentive for the dentist to keep costs down so 
as to maximise profit which effective-
ly minimises inflationary pressures on the service. With fee-per-item the 
patient benefits from increased com-petition between practices in terms of the maintenance of quality stand-ards, particularly in areas of high dentist-to-population ratios. There is no incentive for supervised neglect 
and there is a financial incentive to carry out treatment earlier, thus re-sulting in smaller restorations, ear-lier orthodontic interventions and fewer root canal therapies. There is generally a greater allegiance to pa-
tients with a financial incentive to follow-up non-attenders and to insti-
tute an efficient recall system.Fee-per-item is criticised for giving a potential incentive to ‘over-treat-ment’ or ‘supplier induced demand’17, encouraging dentists to err on the 
side of ‘drilling and filling’, going against trends in clinical best practice, leading to an emphasis on the speed of treatment rather than quality, and failing to encourage a preventive ap-proach (since dentists were not paid to spend time with patients explaining how they could maintain their dental health). Fee-per-item encourages the use of services by patients on the ad-
vice of the dentist and thus inflating dental care costs with little impact on oral health itself. The role of regula-
tion in determining fees is influential in determining costs. Regulated fees are generally negotiated between national dental associations and the health authorities. Costs can only oc-cur when  treatment is  provided, so 
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13. Nyhan T. An analysis of the allo-cation of resources within the state funded systems of oral health care in late 20th century Ireland. MPDH disser-tation, National University of Ireland, Cork; 2000.14. Holloway PJ, Lennon MA, Mellor AC, Coventry P, Worthington HV. The capita-tion study. 1. Does capitation encourage ‘supervised neglect’? Br Dent J. 1990 Feb 10; 168(3):119–21.15. Blinkhorn AS, Hassall DC, Holloway PJ, Mellor AC, Worthington HV. An as-sessment of capitation in the new general dental service contract. Community Dent Health. 1996 Jun;13 (Suppl 1):3–20.16. Grytten J, Holst D, Skau I. Per capita remuneration of dentists and the quality of dental services. Community Dent Oral Epidemiol. 2013 Jan. 17. Zweifel P. Supplier induced demand in a model of physician behaviour. In: Jacques van der Gaag, Morris Perlman, editors. Health, economics and health economics. Amsterdam: North-Holland; 1981.p245–67.18. Woods N. Aligning treatment pro-vided with epidemiologically predicted treatment need for oral health services by GMS recipients in the Republic of Ire-land. PhD dissertation, National Univer-sity of Ireland, Cork; 2005.19. Donaldson C, Gerard K. Economics of 
health care financing: the visible hand. London: McMillan Press; 1993.20. Cuyler AJ, Cullis JG. Hospital waiting lists and the supply and demand for in-patient care. York: Institute of Social and Economic Research. Cited in An econom-ic perspective on waiting list initiatives; 1976.21. Burt BA, Elkhound SA. Dentistry, den-tal practice, and the community. 4th ed. Philadelphia, WB Saunders Company; 1992. p253–63.22. Godsen T, Forland F, Kristiansen IS, Sutton M, Leese B, Guiffrida A, et al. Capi-tation, salary, fee-for-service and mixed systems of payment: effects on the pri-mary care of physicians. Cochrane Data-base Syst Rev. 2000;(3):CD002215.23. Manning WG, Morris C, Newhouse JP, Larry LO, Naihua D, Keeler EB, et al. A two-part model of the demand for medical care:  preliminary results from the health insurance study. In: Van Der Gaag, Perlman J, editors. Health, econom-ics, and health economics. Amsterdam: North Holland; 1981.
patients was the greatest. The per 
capita element could have the high-est weighting in areas with the high-est dentist to population ratios, and thus reduce the likelihood of supplier inducement. The blend of incentives can be adjusted periodically based on the requirements of policy makers.
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This increases the likelihood of poor oral health and increases the proba-bility of requiring dental services. The zero cost at the point of consumption as a result of insurance encourages a higher rate of utilisation than would 
otherwise be efficient. This creates a gap between the costs of what is pro-vided and the value or willingness to pay for it. The over-consumption of services results in a welfare loss to society as a whole. Consumer moral hazard can be counteracted by a co-payment system, whereby the patient pays some fraction of the dental fee. 
This provides a financial incentive to prevent oral disease and reduce con-sumption of dental services. Dentists’ 
behaviour can by influenced by the type of graduate education, organisa-tion of dental services at the clinical level, and accountability with the sys-tem of delivery (probity).
ConclusionThe optimal dental contract may be a ‘blended’ payment system whereby dentists receive a proportion of their income through capitation, a propor-tion from fee-per-item, and propor-tion from fixed salary or allowances. The per capita element would ensure more equity in access to dental ser-vices for the whole population and encourage prevention. The propor-tion from fee-per-item would max-imise productivity and patient visits. The proportion from fixed salary or allowances should be performance 
related with financial incentive as-
sociated with achieving defined and measurable goals related to care pro-cesses. This may encourage dentists to form group practices.A ‘blended’ payment system with an adjustable incentive formula, ne-gotiated between the dental associa-tion and the agency providing remu-neration, will act to counteract any variation in either patterns of treat-ment need or geographical varia-tions. The fee-per-item element could have the highest weighting where the population of high-risk to caries 
